with Sean Flynn and Andra Ghent
Revise & Resubmit, Management Science
We study firms’ return-to-office (RTO) policies by hand-collecting and classifying announcements for the Russell 3000. Among announcing firms, most allow some remote work, but few allow fully remote work. We develop a simple model of a firm’s RTO policy in which a firm trades off productivity loss from work-from-home (WFH) against savings on employee wages and office rent. Relatively lower office rents in a city are associated with more in-person work. Further, firms with female CEOs allow more WFH and firms with older CEOs allow less WFH. Finally, we find no consistently significant stock market reaction to policy announcements; this is consistent with firms correctly balancing the tradeoffs related to WFH, the market having no better information than managers about the optimal policy, or uncertainty on the part of both managers and investors about the optimal policy.
Presented at the AFA Annual Meeting (2026), Rocky Mountain Urban & Real Estate Conference (2026), Bloomberg Center for Cities at Harvard University (2025), AREUEA (2025, 2024), Eastern Finance Association (2025), Treasury Office of Financial Research (2024), UNC CREDA Symposium (2024), Stanford Implications of Remote Work Conference (2024), FMA Annual Meeting (2024), Federal Reserve Board (2023), North American Urban Economics Association (2023), and seminars at Virginia, Georgia, Illinois, and Utah
Active ETFs as Attention Assets: Retail Trading Meets Managed Funds
with Da Huang and Christopher Schwarz
In contrast to active mutual funds (AMFs), active exchange-traded funds (AETFs) are growing rapidly. Their popularity is due to their structure, not performance, as AETFs underperform AMFs. Specifically, attention-driven retail investors trade AETFs as they trade equities: by chasing extreme short-term returns, both positive and negative, which creates a U-shaped flow-performance relation. However, long-term underperformance triggers little outflow, incentivizing AETF managers to raise volatility. Indeed, these managers, who have little overlap with AMF managers, take significantly more risk. Overall, our results show how active management’s migration from mutual funds to ETFs reshapes investor behavior and manager incentives.
Presented at the Conference on Financial Market Regulation (2026), FMA Annual Meeting (2025), ICI Summer Research Workshop (2025), and Northeastern University (2025)